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I.

INTRODUCTION
Lawyers, landmen, land owners and producers face
a long list of perennial problems when interpreting or
drafting documents that affect mineral estates. I and
others have written extensively about these problems,
including the "fixed versus floating NPRi" issue
addressed in a recent Texas Supreme Court case, Hysaw
v. Dawkins. I In that case, three siblings, who were
beneficiaries of their mother's will, disputed the
appellate court's holding that the double fraction 1/3 of
118 created a fixed I/24th non-participating royalty
interest (npri), rather than a floating 1/3 npri. The
dispute arose when one sibling leased her land and
negotiated a I/5th landowner's royalty, rather than the
once-common I/8th. The case presented the Texas
Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify mixed
results from appellate court cases. This paper reviews
cases prior to Hysmv and discusses the lessons that
opinion provides regarding the "fixed versus floating"
npri issue. That discussion reveals that while Hysaw
avoids bright-line resolutions, it provides direction for
interpreting existing deeds and drafting lessons for new
documents in the shale era.
II.

BACKGROUND: WHY DRAFTERS USE
DOUBLE OR CONFLICTING FRACTIONS 2
Property owners face two key decisions when
creating, by grant or reservation, interests in their
subsurface estates: first, whether to create a mineral

1

2016 WL 352229 (Tex. Sup. Ct.). The author worked on
this case in the Texas Supreme Court jointly with Mary
Keeney, Boyce Cabaniss, and John McFarland, the lawyers
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interest or a royalty interest; and second, what the
fractional size of that interest should be. 3 This section
examines courts' interpretations of deeds affecting the
second decision and the lessons those decisions teach
regarding drafting in the shale era.

A.

Why Conflicting Fractions Were Used and Why
They Are Not Necessary
Assume Owner has decided to convey to Grantee
an undivided 1/2 fractional mineral interest, rather than
a royalty interest. Assume also that Owner has
previously leased his land to Oil Company with a
familiar lease form, which is commonly viewed as
creating a fee simple determinable estate in the lessee.
That lease is an older version requiring the lessee to pay
the owner-lessor the traditional, but no longer common,
118 landowner's royalty. 4 This form lease conveys a fee
simple determinable estate in all, or 818, of the mineral
estate to Oil Company, leaving Owner with a
non-possessory future interest, called a possibility of
reverter, in all, or 8/8, of the mineral estate. 5 Note that
only in the oil patch will one find "the whole" defined
as 8/8. As described below, this phenomenon and others
stem from the legacy of the 118 royalty in older form
leases.
Today it is clear that Owner's pre-existing lease has
not converted Owner's interest in the mineral estate
from an interest in all (8/8) to only 1/8. 6 The lease's
royalty clause entitles Owner to a share of the proceeds
from the sale of the production, but does not reduce the
size of his possibility of reverter. 7 Owner owns a
non-possessory interest in all of the minerals, but he can
convey a fractional interest subject to the pre-existing
lease. To convey the desired undivided 1/2 mineral
interest, the owner should use "mineral" language and
insert the fraction 1/2 in the form's designated space for
the fractional interest Owner intends to convey. 8
966 S.W.2d 451, 460 (Tex. 1998); I ERNEST E. SMITH &
JACQUELINE L. WEA VER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS
§ 3.09(E), at 3-78 (2009) (noting possibility of reverter is

who represented the Hysaw parties in the tria1 court and court

vested interest lessor retains after granting a lease); see

of appeals.
2
This part of the paper is from. Laura H. Burney, Oil,

PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS &
MEYERS MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 818 (Aileen M.
Sterling et al. eds., 11th ed. 2000) (describing a possibility of

Gas, and Mineral Titles: Resolving Perennial Problems in the
Shale Era, 62 K.U. L. REV. 97. 103-122 (2013).
3
See White v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967, 976 (Tex. 1948)

(determining the mineral estate was not partitionable in kind).

reverter as the '·interest left in a grantor or 1essor after a grant

ofland or minerals subject to a special limitation").
6

Laura H. Burney, The Interaction of the Division Order
and the Lease Royalty Clause, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 353, 429

Therefore, owners tend to grant or reserve undivided interests
in their subsurface estates. These undivided interests can be
expressed with fractions or percentages. As demonstrated
above, conflicting fractions have spavmed the most litigation.
4
See Laura H. Burney, Jnte1preting Mineral and Royalty
Deeds: The Legacy of the One-Eighth Royalty and Other
Stories, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. l, 28 (acknowledging leases

8/8).

traditionally convey a l/8 royalty).
'Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co ..

goals, see, e.g.. 4 ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE

(1997) ("'[l]t should be considered well-settled in Texas that
the oil and gas lease vests 8/Sths of the oil and gas in the
lessee, not 7/8ths, with the lessor retaining a possibility of
reverter in 8/8ths.").
7

Id (noting lessor retains a possibility of reverter in all

8

For examples of deed forms for accomplishing these
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the Fixed vs. Floating Non~Particioating Royalty Interest Issue?

1.

Why Multiclause Deed Forms Were Used and Why
They Are Not Necessary
Another fact is clear today: as a matter of law,
Grantee's 1/2 undivided ownership in Owner's mineral
estate entitles her to a proportionate share of the rents
and royalties payable under the terms of the pre-existing
lease. 9 Therefore, after the conveyance, Oil Company
owes 1/2 of the 1/8 landowner's lease royalty to Owner
and the other 1/2 to Grantee. 10 That fact, however,
eluded early courts.

The reason for this omission is simple: these clauses
were inserted not to make additional grants, but to
clarify that the grantee receives a proportionate amount
of rents and royalties under any lease, existing or
future. 17
Courts eventually corrected the errors of
Caruthers. 18 But the form, which should be avoided,
exists in formbooks today. 19 If filled out properly, with
the same fraction in every clause, it presents no
problems for title examiners or courts. Unfortunately,
misconceptions among laypersons and legal minds have
complicated drafting and interpreting these deeds. The
primary offender is the "estate misconception." 20

a.

Development of the "Multiclause" Deed Fann
For example, in Caruthers v. Leonard, the court
held that a conveyance subject to an existing lease did
not entitle the grantee to a proportionate share of the
rents and royalties payable under that existing lease. 11 In
response to that decision, which was later overruled, 12 a
notorious deed form with multiple clauses and spaces
for fractions developed to insure that Grantee received
rents and royalties in proportion to the fractional mineral
interest conveyed. 13 Specifically, in addition to the
granting clause, this deed form recited that the
conveyance is made "subject to" the existing lease and
"covers and includes" the specified fractional interest of
rents and royalties in the existing lease. 14 Another clause
provided that the grantee would receive the stated
fractional interest in rents and royalties payable w1der
future leases. 15 Notably, these additional subject to and
future lease clauses lacked granting clause language. 16

b.

Role of the "Estate Misconception"
The estate misconception-a legacy of the "usual
I/8th landowner's royalty"-describes the confusion
regarding estate ownership after leasing property. 21 In
the example above, Owner, under the influence of the
estate misconception, asswned the lease converted his
ownership to 1/8 in the mineral estate. Therefore, if
Owner intended to convey an undivided I12 interest, he
multiplied that fraction by 1/8 and inserted the fraction
1116 in the deed's granting clause. Because of the
wording of the other post-Caruthers clauses-the
subject to and future lease clauses-Owner inserted the
fraction 1/2 in those spaces, creating a deed with
conflicting fractions. 22

14

SERIES: LAND TITLES AND TITLE EXAMJNATION § 23. 70 (3d
ed. 2012): 6 WILLIAM B. BURFORD, WEST'S TEXAS FORMS:
MINERALS. On. & GAS§ I :3 (4th ed. 2012).
9
See, e.g., Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 464 (fmding
grantor's possibility ofreverterof l/12 of the mineral interests
included a right to royalties under the lease terms): see also

/d at 86.

15Jd
16Jd.
17

/d. (noting this form of deed was in response to correct

the holding in Caruthers. which found "that when a grantee
received an interest in a mineral estate that \\'as already under
lease, only a reversionaI)' interest passed'').

Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Ro}'alty Deeds, supra note

18

4. at 14--15 (noting "the deed effectively conveyed all
attributes" of the mineral lease, including the right to share

Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 306 (1943) (noting

the court in Hager overruled Caruthers).
19

royalties).
10

The proportionate reduction clause in typical lease
forms allo\VS the lessee to reduce these pay1nents

See. e.g., BURFORD, supra note 8, at§ l :2 (outlining the

various clauses included in a mineral deed form and
cautioning against ''coupling with a grant of the minerals the
\.Vords 'royalty,' 'royalty interest,' or minerals 'produced and

proportionately to O\Wler and Grantee if they have leased l 00
percent. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 5, at 871-72

saved' from the land" to avoid conveying a royalty interest).
20

(defining "'proportionate reduction clause'' and noting that the
purpose of such a clause is to reduce the payments to a lessor
to be in proportion to the lessor's interest).

See Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod.

Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 460 (Tex. 1998) (defining "estate
misconception" and describing its effect on drafting); Burney,
The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 11, at 87-89 (reviewing

11 254

S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923), abrogated by
Hager v. Stakes. 294 S.W. 835 (Tex. 1927); see Laura H.
Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine
in Texas Deed Construction, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 87-89
(1993)(discussing the legacy of the Caruthers decision).
12
See generally Hager, 294 S.W. 835: Harris v. Currie,
176 S.W.2d 302. 306 (1943) (noting Hager's overroling of

the estate misconception).
21
See Burney. interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds,
supra note 4, at 15 (explaining lessors sometimes believe they
only own 1/8 interests in the minerals after the lease when in

actuality they have a possibility of reverter in 8/8).
22
See Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 11. at
86-87 (emphasizing the effect of the Caruthers decision on
deed forms and noting that grantors wishing to convey a 1/2

Caruthers).
13

See generally Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth. supra
note 11. at 86-90 (outlining the development of the
multiclause deed form).

mineral interest "can do so by simply conveying a 1/2 mineral
interest, regardless of an existing lease").
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By the 1990s, Pennzoil owned the grantor's
interest, if any, under the 1937 deed, and Concord Oil
owned the grantee's interest. 30 Just as today's shale
plays are spawning lawsuits over mineral deeds
delivered decades ago, renewed production on property
covered by the 193 7 deed prompted Pennzoil to sue
Concord Oil in 1993.
Pennzoil relied on precedent establishing the
two-grant approach for interpreting multiclause deeds
with conflicting fractions. Under that approach,
Pennzoil argued that the 193 7 deed had conveyed a l /96
mineral interest and a 1112 interest in rents and royalties
under an existing lease, which had terminated.
Therefore, Pennzoil claimed that Concord Oil, as
successor to the grantee, owned only a 1/96 interest in
the mineral estate, meaning Pennzoil owned the
grantor's remaining interest. Concord Oil, on the other
hand, argued that the 193 7 deed had conveyed the
grantor's entire 1112 interest and Pennzoil had received
nothing through its chain of title. 31
The trial court and court of appeals agreed with
Pennzoil. 32 Eventually, however, the Texas Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Concord Oil, holding that the
conflicting fractions could be harmonized from the
four-comers of the document. Jn light of the particular
language of the 193 7 deed, the court held it conveyed a
single 1/12 mineral interest. 33
However, because the opinion was a plurality, with
concurring and dissenting opinions, the fate of the
two-grant doctrine remained unclear. 34 Concord Oil had
urged the court to reject the two-grant doctrine and
embrace the estate misconception as the explanation for
conflicting fractions in multiclause deed fonns. As
explained above, that misconception, which emanates
from the typical 1/8 landowner's royalty, explains why

B.

Interpreting Multiclause Deeds with Conflicting
Fractions: The Birth and Demise of the
"'Two-Grant" Doctrine
These multiple fractions created uncertainty for
title examiners. Which fraction represented the size of
the interest Owner intended to convey? Or did the deed
make multiple grants? Early cases provided an answer:
deeds with multiple and conflicting fractions conveyed
more than one interest. 23 Writers labeled this
interpretative approach the "two-grant" doctrine. 24 In
this section, I review the development and demise of the
two-grant approach to interpreting deeds with
conflicting fractions. The next section updates a related
issue: deed forms with double or restated fractions.
Concord Oil Company v. Pennzoil Exploration &
Production Company
The two-grant doctrine arose in Texas, where the
multiclause deed form originated. Texas courts adopted
this interpretative approach for multiclause deed forms
with conflicting fractions beginning in the 1940s. 25 The
last supreme court case to address the two-grant doctrine
is a 1998 opinion, Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil
Exploration & Production Co. 26
In Concord Oil, courts were confronted with this
deed: a 1937 conveyance of a mineral interest with the
fraction 1/96 in the granting clause and the fraction 1112
in a subsequent clause. 27 At the time, the grantor owned
a 1II2 mineral interest in the property, which was
burdened by a pre-existing lease providing for a 118
landowner's royalty. 28 Notably, the deed through which
the grantor had received his 1I12 mineral interest a year
earlier was the same as the 193 7 deed fonn but the
fraction 1/12 appeared in both clauses. 29
I.

23

was brought through the grantee of the 1937 deed and that the
1937 grantor conveyed another mineral deed in 1961 which

Some cases vie\\ ed these deeds as granting one fl-action
1

at delivery of the deed that expanded upon expiration of the
existing lease. See, e.g., Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d
466, 467 (Tex. 1991) (noting that, upon tennination of the
lease, the grantee's interest "expanded into a full one-half

was subsequently conveyed to Pennzoil Exploration and

Production Company).
3
'Jd. at 454.
32 Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co.,
878 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. App. 1994) (r~jecting Concord's
reading of the deed to convey two separate estates), rev 'd, 966
S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1998).
33
Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 453.
34
The opinion breaks down to a 4-1-4 decision. Id. at 454.
The plurality found that the deed conveyed a single 1112

fn1ineral interest] by operation of law'')~ see also Burne:'. The
Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 11, at 92-94 (discussing the
··expansion facet" and related decisions, including Jupiter
Oil).
24

See Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 454 (discussing the

trial court's reliance on the tvvo-grant doctrine in its decision

and defining the doctrine): 2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS &
CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 327.2 (2012)
[hereinafter 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS]; Tevis Herd, Deed

mineral interest and harmonized the conflicting fractions

within the deed. Id. (plurality opinion). The concurring
opinion by Justice Enoch agreed that only a single estate was

Construction and the "Repugnant to the Grant" Doctrine, 21
TEX. TECH L. REV. 635, 651 (1990).
25 Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note I], at 90.
26
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created but "'1'ote
overconveyance that

separately to emphasize the
would occur if the dissent's
interpretations were used. Id. (Enoch, J., concurring). The
dissent argued for the ''two-grant" doctrine to determine that
two estates were created, ·•a 1/96 perpetual interest in the
minerals, and a 1/12 interest in rentals and royalties ... ."Id.

966 S. W.2d 451

27

ld at 453.
"Id.
29Jd
30
ld. at 453-54 (noting Concord Oil Company's claim

at 465 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
3
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the conflicting fractions follow a pattern: they are
multiples of 1/8. Typically, drafters multiplied the
intended fraction by 1/8 and inserted that number in the
granting clause. Indeed, early case law sanctioned that
approach. 35
The 193 7 Concord Oil deed followed the pattern:
1/96 in the granting clause= 1/8 times 1/12 (the fraction
in the subsequent clause). 36 As another example, the
deed at issue in a 1991 Texas Supreme Court case,
Lucke/ v. . White, contained the fractions 114 in the
subject to and future lease clauses, but the smaller
fraction l /32 in the granting clause ( 114 times 118
= 1/32). 37 As noted in Concord Oil, in light of the
language appearing in the subsequent clauses, that
fraction, rather than the smaller fraction in the granting
clause, reflects the drafter's intent about the size of the
interest the grantor intended to convey.

one-eighth royalty. In conveying minerals
su~ject to an existing lease ... mistake is often
made in the fraction of the minerals conveyed
by multiplying the intended fraction by
one-eighth. 40
In Concord Oil, however, the Texas Supreme Court
declined to fully follow the Shepard approach. Instead,
the court noted the estate misconception, but viewed it
as "instructive, but not dispositive." 41 In fact, the court
declined to adopt any bright-line rules for this
interpretative issue, focusing instead on the lack of any
two-grant language in the 1937 deed. 42
b.

Guidelines from Concord Oil's "Four-Comers"
Approach
Yet, as I wrote in an earlier article, the Concord Oil
opinion provided "useful guidance to title examiners"
for interpreting multiclause deeds:

a.

The Court Declined to Follow the Kansas
Approach Regarding the Estate Misconception
To convince the Texas court to incorporate the
estate misconception into the interpretative process,
Concord Oil pointed to Kansas decisions. Specifically,
in Shepard v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
the Kansas Supreme Court construed a reservation in a
deed that described the size of the interest as "an
undivided 114 of the landowners [sic] 1/8 royalty, or,
l /32 of the interest in and to all oil, gas or other
minerals . . . ."38 The court held the grantor had
reserved a 1/4 mineral interest.39 In reaching this
conclusion, the court incorporated into its interpretative
process the pervasive confusion among "not only
persons in the petroleum industry" but with courts:

First, according to the opinion, a deed with
multiple fractions should not be interpreted as
making two grants unJess express language to
that effect appears in the deed. Such language
would include the phrases 'separate from' or
'in addition to,' phrases which were absent
from the Concord deed. Notably, [the
additional clauses in multiclause deed forms]
do not contain such granting language.
Therefore, multiclause deed forms should
rarely, if ever, be interpreted as making
separate grants. 43
Because of the multiple opinions in Concord Oil, title
examiners remained cautious about interpreting
multiclause deed forms with conflicting fractions. The
concurring opinion created particular concern by
focusing on the future lease clause.44 In his opinion,
Justice Enoch criticized the plurality opinion for having

As the most common leasing arrangement
provides for a one-eighth royalty reserved to
the lessor, the confusion of fractional interests
stems primarily from the mistaken premise
that all the lessor-land-owner owns is a
35

Tipps v. Bodine, JOI S.W.2d 1076. 1079 (Tex. Ct. App.
1937): see also Concord Oil Co .. 966 S.W.2d at 464-65 (Tex.
1998) (Enoch. J., concurring) (blessing the use of different
fractions to convey a single

interest)~

39

ld. at27.
/d at 26 (citing Magnusson v. Colorado Oil & Gas
Corp., 331 P.2d 577, 583-84 (Kan. 1958)); see also Burney,
Jnte1preting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 4, at 22
40

see also Burney, The

Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 11, at 102 (noting the reliance
on Tipps in interpreting multiclause deeds).
36
Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 453.
37

Chapter 20

(noting the pervasiveness of the 118 royalty in other
jurisdictions). Shepard did not involve a multi clause deed
form; rather, the language fits the ''restated" or "'double
fraction" problem; see also Heyen v. Hartnett, 679 P.2d 1152.
1157-58 (Kan. 1984) (construing deed with fractions 1/16
and I 12 as conveying an undivided 1/2 mineral interest).
41
Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 460.
42
/d at 460~1.

819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991). For a summary of

the Lucke/ decision, see Burney, Jnte1preting Mineral and

Royalty Deeds. supra note 4, at 9-11 (rejecting the "granting
clause prevails" standard under Alford and instead relying on
the presence or absence of a future lease clause in determining

43

the intent of the parties and the fraction conveyed).
38
368 P.2d 19, 21 (Kan. 1962). The Shepard deed was not

Burney, Jnte1preting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra

note 4. at 16.

a multiclause deed form, but it contained multiple fractions.

"Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 464 (Enoch, J.,

The Shepard deed form involved "double and restated"

concurring) ("Further, we \vere \\Tong to conclude that the

'subject to· clause of the Crosby deed includes future

fractions discussed in the next section. See infra Part 11.C.

4
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future lease clause. 53 In other words, in Neel the court
reverted to the two-grant doctrine.
In reaching this conclusion, the Neel court cited
Concord Oil and Lucke/, explaining that those cases
required it to seek the parties' intent from the four
comers of the document. 54 However, the Neel opinion
omits any review of the two-grant saga, or of the
specifics from Concord Oil, such as the court's
admonition that to create separate grants a deed should
contain clear evidence of such intent. Had the Neel court
followed Concord Oil's guidance, the deed would have
been interpreted as conveying the I 12 "of' royalty
forever as set forth in the granting clause. The estate
misconception explains the fraction in the future lease
clause: 1/16 reflects the amount of production owed to
the owner of a royalty entitled to 112 of the 1/8 royalty
reserved in the typical lease royalty clause."
Although the Texas Supreme Court declined to
review Neel, a recent opinion from the same court of
appeals "disapprove[d] of [its] analysis in Neel." 56
Hausser v. Cuellar involved a multiclause deed form
that, like the deed in Neel, contained conflicting
fractions that departed from the Concord Oil pattern. 57
In Hausser, the clauses provided as follows: granting
clause: 1/2; subject to clause: 1/2; future lease clause:
1/16. 58 After determining that the deed conveyed a
royalty interest, the court considered whether it was a
fixed 1/16 or a 112 royalty interest that entitled the
owner to 1/2 of the 1/4 landowner's royalty in new
leases on the property. 59 In adopting the 1/2 royalty
option, the court cited its 2006 opinion in Gar::a v.
Pro/ithic Energy Co., and explained its analysis as
follows: "As in Gar:a, our decision is consistent with
Concord Oil Co. because the [Hausser] deed does not
contain any language suggesting two differing estates
were being conveyed. Rather, the [Hausser] deed, like

emphasized a future lease clause in the deed as the basis
for concluding the 193 7 deed conveyed a 1112 interest. 45
However, the plurality opinion adopted a four-comers
approach and placed no significance on the presence or
absence of any clause, particularly a future lease clause.
On the contrary, that opinion states that the "decision in
this case does not depend on the presence or absence of
a 'future lease' clause, which the court of appeals found
dispositive. " 46
2.

Post-Concord Oil Decisions: The Demise of the
"Two-Grant" Doctrine
Despite these words from the Texas Supreme Court
about the relative insignificance of a future lease clause,
a post-Concord Oil appellate opinion considered it
determinative. Neel v. Killam Oil Co. 47 involved a
multiclause deed fonn that departed from the typical
pattern. Specifically, in the 1945 Neel deed, the larger
fraction 1/2 appeared in the granting clause and subject
to clause, and the smaller fraction I 116 appeared in the
future lease clause. 48 The parties agreed the interest was
a royalty interest, rather than a mineral interest. 49
Regarding the size of the interest, grantee's successor
argued the deed conveyed a 112 royalty, which would
entitle the grantee to I 12 of the royalty reserved in any
existing or future leases. 50 To counter assertions that the
granting clause and future lease clause made separate
grants, the grantee pointed to this sentence in the deed's
granting clause: "[t]his grant shall run forever." 51 The
controversy arose after the existing lease, with the
typical 1/8 landowner's royalty, terminated and new
leases were executed providing for a 1/4 royalty. 52 The
court of appeals ruled against the grantee, holding the
grantee was entitled to a fixed 1/16 interest in
production under the new leases as provided in the

53
1d. at 341. Neel was heard by the Fourth Court of
Appeals in San Antonio, the same court that decided Concord
prior to its reviev.r by the Supreme Court.
54
Nee/, 88 S.W.3d at 339-40.
55
See supra Part 11.A.b.
56
Hausser v. C..uellar, 345 S. W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. App.
2011) (pet. denied). In disapproving, the court pointed to the
Neel opinion's reliance on a previous deed, which could
suggest the court approved of Neel's focus on the future lease
clause. Id Fortunately, the Hausser opinion embraced
Concord Oil's guidance and cited one of its previous

leases."). For a complete analysis of the concurring opinion.
see Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra
note 4, at 17. Justice Enoch was also concerned with the
•·overconveyance'' issue (explaining that a two-grant

interpretation of the deed would result in the grantor
conveying more than he o\\11ed, vdtich he cannot do).
45
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Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 463-64 (Enoch, L

concurring).
46
/d. at 458-59 (plurality opinion).
47

88 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. App. 2002), disapproved of by
Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S. W.3d 462, 469-70 (Tex. App.
2011).
48
1d. at 339.
49Id. at 339-40. The parties disagreed about whether this
royalty interest was a fixed 1/16 or a 1/2 royalty that entitled
the owner to 112 of the royalty reserved in any lease. This

S.W.3d 137, 145 (Tex. App. 2006) (pet. denied)) (noting the
conflicting fractions arise due to the typical 1/8 royalty and

'"fixed" vs. "of' roya1ty issue is common and addressed in Part

confusion about

opinions, Gar:;a, \\ hich clearly rejected the t\vo-grant doctrine
and incorporated the estate misconception into its analysis.
See id at 470-71 (citing Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., 195
1

n. c of this paper (double and restated fractions).
50

571d.

~"hat

at 470-71.
58 Id. at 465, 468.
591d. at 470-71.

/d. at340.

s11d.
52Jd.
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landowner's royalty," which contributes to the estate
misconception, and its effect on drafting and
intetpreting double and restated fractions. 65 Because
parties focused on that royalty, they expressed fractions
with a double fraction, where one was invariably 1/8, or
by restating with a fraction equal to a multiple of 118, as
in the restated example above. Rather than analyze that
legacy in light of other language in the deed, courts
tended to ignore it or merely multiply the fractions.
For example, in a 1984 Texas Supreme Court case,
Alford v. Krum, the multiclause deed contained a double
fraction, 112 of l /8 in the granting clause. 66 The court
viewed that clause as conveying a 1116 interest, without
noting or analyzing this mode of expressing that single
fraction. 67 This phenomenon, like the use of the fraction
8/8 to express the term "all," appears only in the oil
patch. And again, the legacy of the usual 1/8 royalty
explains the practice since one of the two fractions is
invariably the traditional 1/8 landowner's royalty. Yet
in Alford and other cases, court opinions multiply the
fractions without analyzing the reason for the formula.
Before Alford, proponents of the analysis approach
had argued that courts should incotporate the legacy of
the 1/8 royalty into the intetpretative process for these
fractional issues. 68 Under such an approach, the double
or restated fractions "should not be multiplied, but
analyzed to determine the parties' intent." 69 Not all
commentators agree with this approach, however.
Specifically, the Williams & Meyers Treatise argues
that double fractions should be multiplied under a plain
meaning approach to document intetpretation. 70 As

the deeds in Garza, involves a single conveyance with
fixed rights. " 60
A dissenting opinion in Hausser argued that the
future lease clause should have controlled. 61 However,
in light of the majority's disapproval of Neel, its
adherence to Con cord Oil's guidelines, and other recent
appellate court decisions that acknowledge the role of
the estate misconception,6' the two-grant doctrine
should disappear in Texas. Fortunately, other
jurisdictions have wisely declined to adopt Texas's
approach. 63 Therefore, title examiners may report,
without exaggerating, the death of the two-grant
doctrine for intetpreting multiclause deeds with
conflicting fractions in the shale era. Unfortunately, as
described in the next section, court opinions have not
sufficiently incotporated the estate misconception or the
"legacy of the I/8th royalty" into the intetpretative
process for related issues: deeds with double or restated
fractions.

C.

"Double" or 0 Restated" Fractions-The
Continued Legacy of the "Usual I/8th
Landowner's Royalty"
Writing before the shale era, I addressed these two
intetpretative issues: how should courts intetpret deeds
when the fractional interest conveyed or reserved is
expressed (I) as a double fraction, such as "1/2of1/8,"
or (2) as a restated fraction, such as "an undivided 1/2
non-participating royalty (being equal to, not less than
an undivided 1/16)."64 In one article, I note courts'
failure to address the "legacy of the usual I/8th
"'Id. at 470 (citing Garza, 195 S.W.3d at 146: Concord
Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451,
457 (Tex. 1998)).
61
Id. at 472-73 (Marion. J., dissenting). Note the same

Anderson, Recent Deve/op111ents in Nonregulato1y Oil and
Gas Lmv. 45 INST. ON On. & GAS L. & TAX'N § 1.03[4]. at 1-

judge wrote the majority opinion in Neel v. Killa111 Oil Co.,
Ltd., 88 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. App. 2002), disapproved of
by Hausser, 345 S.W.3d at 470.
62
See Hamilton v. Morris Res., Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336,

note 4, at 23-28: Burney. The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note
I!, at 89-97. The restated language in the example appeared
in Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. 1980)
(holding deed ambiguous, which required remand to trial
court).
65 See genera!Zr Burney, lnte1preting Mineral and
Royalty Deeds, supra note 4.
66671 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex. 1984), overruled by Luckel
v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991).
"Id. at 873-74. Alford adopted the "granting clause"
prevails rule for the multiclause deed problem, but was
subsequently overruled by Lucke/, 819 S.W.2d at 461.

14 (1994)).
64

343-44 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that although there
were differing fractions in the deed, only a single interest \Vas
actually conveyed): Garza, 195 S.W.3d at 145 (noting the

''problematic conflict between the granting of a mineral
interest and a future lease provision appearing to convey a

smaller royalty interest"); see also Coates Energy Trust v.
Frost Nat'l Bank. No. 04-11-00838-CV. 2012 WL 5984693,
at *6--7 (Tex. App. Nov. 28. 2012) (relying on Hausser in
determining the fraction conveyed); Hernandez v. El Paso
Prod. Co., No. 13-09-184-CV, 2011 WL 1442991, at *4 (Tex.
Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2011) (taking notice of the estate

68

Burney, Jnte1preting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra

Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra

note 4, at 24 (citing Ernest E. Smith, Conv~vancing Problems,
STATE BAR OF TEX., ADVANCED On., GAS, & MINERAL LAW
COURSE G. G-2 (1981)).

misconception).
63
Bumey, Oil, Gas & Mineral Titles, supra note 2, at 24

69

/d. at 25. Not all comn1entators agree with this

approach. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 24, at
§ 327.3, at 94. l (2012).

(describing the courts' methods of dealing with mineral
deeds); see also Burney, lnte1preting Mineral and Royall)'
Deeds, supra note 4, at 23 ("[T]he Arkansas Supreme Court

70

See, e.g., 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 24,
§ 327.3, at 94.l: Phillip E. Norvell, Pitfalls in Developing
Lands Burdened by Non-Participating Royalty: Calculating

considered the issue that Jed the Texas courts down the path
to the creative two-grants rule . . . .") (quoting Owen L.
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agreed with the Berrys' interpretation. 77 The court of
appeals, however, held the deed reserved two fixed 1/40
royalty interests, a ruling the Berrys did not appeal to
the Texas Supreme Court. 78
However, an opinion decided two years before
Berry addressed a deed with similar language, including
an express reference to a royalty the size "of' the usual
1/8 lease royalty. The deed in that case, Range
Resources Corp. v. Bradshmv 79 reserved:

described below, recent court opinions also reflect
contradictory opinions in resolving these disputes.

I.

Shale Era Cases: Conflicting Approaches from
Appellate Opinions
Demonstrating that shale-production surges
produce title-litigation surges, Texas courts addressed
several disputes involving double and restated fractions.
Most of these cases involve the grant or reservation of
royalty interests in which the dispute centers on one
question: whether the deed created a "fixed" or an "of'
royalty interest. A "fixed" royalty entitles the owner to
a set share of the proceeds from the sale of production,
regardless of the fractional size of the landowner's
royalty in any lease. 71 An "of' royalty interest varies
with the size of the landowner's royalty in leases-" As
demonstrated in the cases discussed below, these
disputes arise when the royalty in a new lease departs
from the traditional 1/8 landowner's royalty.
Hudspeth v. Berry,'3 a 2010 opinion, involved a
dispute over a 1943 deed reserving an "undivided J/40th
royalty interest (being I/5th of I/8th)" with grantee
reserving leasing rights, and the grantor receiving 115 of
the usual 1/8 royalty. 74 The Berrys owned the reserved
interest and claimed their predecessors were each
entitled to 1/5 of the 115 landowner's royalty reserved in
a new lease, or 1/25 of the proceeds from production. 75
As a result, the Berrys claimed they were entitled to a
total of 2125 of the production proceeds. 76 The trial court

an undivided one-half (I 12) Royalty (Being
equal to not less than an undivided
one-sixteent[h] (1/16)[)] of all the oil, gas
and/or other minerals . , . to be paid or
delivered to said Grantors . . . free of cost
Forever . . . . In the event oil, gas or other
minerals are produced . , . Grantors ... shall
receive not less than one-sixteenth (I I I 6)
portion (being equal to one-half (I 12) of the

customary one-eighth (I 18) Royalty) .... 80
Both the trial court and the court of appeals interpreted
the reservation as a fraction "of' royalty rather than as a
"fixed" fractional royalty. 81 The appellate court opinion
contains an extensive discussion of the difference
between the two types of interests and reviews a 1980
Texas Supreme Court case involving a reservation that
raised the "restated'' fraction problem. 81 Jn that case,
Brown v. Havard, the majority concluded that the deed
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS Law § 327 (2012) [hereinafter
WILLIAMS & MEYERS]. There is an additional difference: the
effect of the executive's duty to lease. With an "of' royalty,
the executive could potentially breach the duty of "utmost
good faith" by negotiating a landowner's royalty that was too
low. See Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., LLC, 395 S.W.3d 348,
364-65 (Tex. App. 2013). If the royalty interest is fixed,
however, the negotiated royalty cannot affect the "fixed"
ov.ner's share of production. See id. (discussing cases in
which the executive breached the duty of utmost good faith
by entering into a lease depriving the royalty O\\ner of

the Royalty Share and Coexisting lt'ith the Duty O\ved to the
Non-Participating Royalty 011 ner by' the Executive, 48 ARK.
L. REv. 933, 951 ( 1995). The author approves of the
1

"multiply" approach used by the Arkansas Supreme Court in

Palmer v. Lide. in which the court held:
It will be seen that the deed refers not once but four

times either to I/8th of I/8th of the royalty or to I/8th
of I/8th of the royalty to be retained or reserved in
any oil, gas, or mineral lease, leases, or contracts. It

is not possible to interpret the unmistakably clear

language of the deed to mean I/8th of I/8th of the
total production, as the appellant would have us do.

benefits they would have received in a lease to a disinterested

party).
73
No. 2-09-225-CV. 2010 WL 2813408 (Tex. App. July
15, 2010). In the interest of full disclosure: I provided an

567 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Ark. 1978). The author concludes that,
"[o]ne cannot quarrel with the construction of the 'double
fraction' formula by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Lide
[sic] .... However, one is haunted by the fear that the 'horrors
of the double fraction' may be the result of an error based
simply on the parties' selection of the wrong royalty deed
form." Norvell, supra note 70 at 951.
71 SMJTH & WEAVER, supra note 5, at§ 3.7, at 3-46
n.187.2.
12See Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490,
493 (Tex. App. 2008) (comparing a fraction "of' royalty
versus a •·fractional'' royalty and stating that a fraction ""or'

expert opinion in support of Berry's position.
74
/d at *2.
75

1d at *I.

76

/d.

"Id.
78

Jd at *4.

79 Range

Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490 (Tex.
App. 2008. pet. denied).
80
Id. at 493-94 (emphasis added).
81
1d at 497.
82 See id. at 493-97 (discussing Brown v. Havard, 593
S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980)).

royalty '"floats in accordance with the size of the landowner's
royalty contained in the lease''); see also WILLIA!'l.1S &
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was ambiguous, but the dissent viewed the deed as
having unambiguously created a fraction "of' royalty. 83
In Range Resources, the court addressed differences
between the two deeds, but ultimately favored the
dissent's approach in Brown. 84 The losing party in
Range Resources asked the Texas Supreme Court to
review the appellate court decision, but the court
declined its petition. 85
A case decided in 2011 appears consistent with
Range Resources rather than BenJ'· In Sundance
Minerals v. Moore, a deed reserved "an undivided and
non-participating one-half interest in the oil, gas and
other mineral rights" or "one halfofthe usual one eighth
royalty received forsuch [sic] oil, gas and other minerals
produced .... " 86 The court held the deed reserved 1/2
"of' the 1/5 landowner's royalty in the subsequent
lease. 87
Although the result in Sundance Minerals reflects
the analysis approach, that opinion, like the Range
Resources opinion, does not overtly address the estate
misconception or the legacy of the 1/8 royalty.
However, in reaching their conclusions both opinions
cite extensively to Lucke/ v. White and follow its
harmonizing approach. 88 That 1991 Texas Supreme
Court opinion, in which the court interpreted a deed with
the conflicting fractions 1/4 and 1/32, expressly
acknowledges the effect of the 1/8 royalty on drafting:

parties intended to convey one-fourth of all
reserved royalty, and that the reference to
I/32nd in the first three clauses is
"harmonized" because one-fourth of the usual
one-eighth royalty is l/32nd. 89
As in Range Resources, the losing party in Sundance
Minerals petitioned the Texas Supreme Court to review
the appellate court's ruling. That petition stressed the
surge of shale production in Texas and the decline of the
usual 1/8 landowner's royalty, and asked the court to
provide guidance:
Practitioners and lower courts dealing with the
resurgence of cases need guidance on
significant, recurring issues like the deed
construction dispute presented in this petition
for review. Especially when language in deeds
use differing fractions to express the intent of
the parties regarding the character and size of
the interest reserved, it is vitally important that
all of the reviewing courts consistently apply
the rules of interpretation and follow
established precedent to reach the same
resuits.9°
Despite this plea for guidance, the Texas Supreme Court
declined to review the court of appeals' decision in
Sundance Minerals. The court also denied a petition for
review in another appellate opinion from 2012, Coghill
v. Griffith. 91 That opinion relies heavily on Lucke! and
cites Range Resources in concluding that a deed with
restated and double fractions created an "of' royalty

We do not quarrel with the assumption that the
parties probably contemplated nothing other
than the usual one-eighth royalty. But that
assumption does not lead to the conclusion
that the parties intended only a fixed l/32nd
interest. It is just as logical to conclude thatthe
83
84

interest. 92
86

593 S.W.2d 939, 942, 945 (McGee, J., dissenting).
Range Res. Corp., 266 S.W.3d at 495-96. The initial

354 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. App. 201 I) (emphasis
added).
87
Id. at 512-13 (a!Tmning trial court's grant of summary
judgment interpreting that the deed reserved 112 of the I15
royalty).
88
See. e.g., Range Res. C01p., 266 S.W.3d at 496
("Construing the deeds as a whole, and harmonizing all parts

dispute in Range Resources was \vhether the executive had
breached its duty to the royalty owner by entering into a lease
with only a 1/8 landowner's royalty. Id. at 492. That duty,
however, has no application to a ''fixed~' royalty interest since
leasing cannot affect the share owed to those interest O\\ners.
See id. at 493. The duty applies when the interest is a fraction
";of' the lease royalty, since the executive must exercise

to give effect to the parties' intent, we determine that a
"fraction of royalty' was conveyed."); Sundance Minerals v.

leasing decisions according to an "utmost good faith"
standard. See Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., LLC, 395 S. W.3d
348, 370 (Tex. App. 2013) (noting when the interest is a

Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. App. 2011) (''All parts of
the deed are to be harn1onized, construing the instrument to

give effect to all of its provisions.").
89
Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991 ).

fraction '"of' the lease royalty, the executive has more control

90

and, therefore, is under an elevated duty). In Range
have negotiated for 1/4 landowners royalty in the lease. 266
S.W.3d at 492.
85

Petition for Review of Sundance Minerals, L.P., at vii,

Sundance Minerals, LP. v. Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507 (Tex.
2012)
(No.
02-I0-00403-CV)
(pet.
denied),
http :/lwv.w. supreme.courts.state. tx. us/ebriefs/ 12/ 1200780 I. p

Resources, the royalty owner claimed the executive could

df.

Petition for Reviev.' of Range Resources Corporation

91

and Range Production I, LP., Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw
(Tex. Dec. 28, 2008) (No. 08-0949) (pet. denied),
http:/l"ww. supreme.courts. state. tx.us/ebriefs/08/08094901. p

Petition for Review of Coghill v. Griffith, 358 S.W.3d
834 (Tex. App. 2012) (No.12-0170) (pet. denied),
(http://data.scotxblog.com/scotx/no/ 12-0 I 70.
92
Id. at 838-40 ("The language used in Range Resources

df.

Co1p. and in the instant case establishes that the interest
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However, another recent opinion retreats to the
"multiply" approach. In Moore v. Noble Energy, the
court viewed the following language as creating a fixed
1/16 royalty interest: "a one-half non-participating
royalty interest
(one-half of one-eighth of
production). " 93 In that opinion, the court relies heavily
on the Williams & Meyers treatise, which approves of
multiplying rather than analyzing double fractions, and
attempts, unsatisfactorily, to distinguish Range
Resources. 94
Another recent appellate court opinion also strains
to distinguish Range Resources and Sundance Minerals
and, like the Moore opinion, retreats to the multiply
approach. 95 Wynne/Jackson Development v. PAC
Holdings, Ltd, involves Barnett shale production from
property in Denton County, Texas. 96 The relevant
language provided that the grantor reserved:

Chapter 20
receive one-half ( 1/2) of any bonus,
overriding royalty interest, or other payments,
similar or dissimilar, payable under the terms
of any oil, gas and mineral lease covering the
above-described property.97

The parties framed the issue as whether the deed
reserved a fixed or fraction "of' royalty.98 In reversing
the trial court and holding the deed reserved a fixed
fractional royalty, the court relied on cases, such as a
1955 Texas Supreme Court decision, that multiplied,
rather than analyzed, double fractions. 99 In other words,
unlike Range Resources and Sundance Minerals, the
Wynne/Jackson decision ignores the legacy of the usual
118 landowner's royalty, despite the express reference to
that royalty in the deed.
Lessons from the Double and Restated Fraction
Cases for the Shale Era
The results reached in Sundance Minerals, Range
Resources, and Coghill reflect the analysis approach for
double and restated fractions. 100 That approach respects
the goal of deed interpretation, which is to ascertain the
intent of the parties. The analysis approach also
promotes title stability by seeking intent from the four
comers of the deeds, without resorting to outside
evidence. Sundance Minerals, Range Resources, and
2.

a non-participating royalty of one-half(l/2) of
the usual one-eighth ( 1/8) royalty in and to all
oil, gas, and other materials produced, saved
and sold from the above-described property,
provided, however, that although said
reserved royalty is non-participating and
Grantee shall own and possess all leasing
rights in and to all oil, gas and other minerals,
Grantor shall, nevertheless, have the right to

reserved was a fraction of royalty and not a fractional

attributes of the inineral estate ov.ned by a mineral fee owner
with those of a non-participating royalty owner). Here, the
grantor reserved a royalty plus the right to receive bonus
payments, a mineral-estate attribute. Id. at *4~ see also

royalty."). The deed's language stated, '1he Grantor reserves
and excepts unto himself ... an undivided one-eighth ( 1/8) of
all royalties payable under the terms of said lease. as well as
an undivided one-eighth ( 1/8) of the usual one-eighth ( 1/8)
royalties provided for in any future" lease. Id. at 836.
93
374 S.W.3d 644, 645 (Tex. App. 2012) (emphasis
added).
9
-isee id. at 647~5 l. The court also relied on Bro\vn v.
Havard, 593 S. W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980). In Brown, a deed
reserved "'an undivided one-half non-participating royalty
(being equal to, not less than an undivided I/16th) ... ."Id
at 940. The majority opinion detem1ined the deed was
ambiguous and returned the case to the trial court. Id at 944.
A dissenting opinion, however, argued that the deed was
unambiguous and conveyed a I /2 "of' royalty. Id. at 945
(McGee, J., dissenting).
95
Wynne/Jackson Dev .. LP. v. PAC Capital Holdings,
Ltd., No. 13-12-00449-CV, 2013 WL 2470898, at *3 (Tex.
App. June 6, 2013).
96
1d. at *1.
97
Id. at *4.
98
The appellate opinion does not suggest that the deed
reserved an undivided I /2 non-executive mineral interest,
perhaps in light of the "non-participating royalty" label. Id at
*4~5. The owner of an undivided 1/2 mineral interest is
entitled to 112 of the royalty, as explained above. However,
under the French redundancy approach, v. hich focuses on

Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. 1986) (finding
the deed, which stripped some mineral-estate attributes,
created a non-executive mineral interest rather than royalty

interest). The Altman deed, however, did not expressly label
the interest a "non-participating royalty interest." Id at 118
(referring instead to a non-participating n1ineral interest).
9
9The court cited Harriss v. Ritter. a case \Vhich held that
the double fractions '"one-half of one-eighth ... could have
but one meaning and that is I/16th of the royalty .... '"
Wynne/Jackson, 2013 WL 2470898, at *4 (quoting Harriss v.
Ritter. 279 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1955)).
100
Sundance Minerals v. Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507, 51113 (Tex. App. 2011) (employing only "the express language
found within the four comers of [the deed]" to detennine the
interested the parties intended to convey): Range Res. Corp.
v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490, 493, 496-97 (Tex. App. 2008)
(looking exclusively to "the objective intent expressed or
apparent in the writing" to determine the royalty conveyed);
Coghill v. Griffith, 358 S. W.3d 834, 836-40 (Tex. App. 2012)
(also using the four corners rule to detennine the parties
intended to grant a fraction of royalty). Another recent case,
\Vhich is not reported, expressly endorses the analysis
approach and consideration of the "'estate n1isconception."
See Hernandez v. El Paso Prod. Co., No. 13-09-184-CV, 2011
WL 1442991, at *4 (Tex. App. Apr. 14, 2011) (citing Laura
H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 11, at 86).

1

express references to other mineral estate attributes, that may
have been a viable argument. See id. at *3 (comparing the
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Coghill reach results consistent with language within the
deeds. Specifically. the deeds in each of those cases
mention the "usual 1/8 lease royalty" and describe the
interest at issue as a fraction "of' that royalty. 101 By
noting those provisions and relying on Lucke/'s
"harmonizing" approach, those opinions incorporate the
legacy of that once-common royalty on drafting into the
interpretative process.
The Berry, Moore, and Wynne/Jackson opinions,
on the other hand, ignore express references to the
"usual 1/8 royalty" and other language, including the
reference to a 1/5 interest in Berry and a 1/2 interest in
Moore and Wynne/Jackson. 101 Further departing from
the four-corners rule, the Moore and Wynne/Jackson
opinions insert language not found in the documentthe fraction 1/16. 103 In short, these three decisions
merely multiply and fail to analyze the language in the
deeds.
For future drafting, the decisions discussed above
and others teach these lessons: drafters should state
expressly whether they intend to convey or reserve a
"fixed fractional interest" rather than a fraction "of' the
royalty reserved in existing and any future leases. An
additional statement should expressly clarify that, for
instance, a fraction is not a "fixed" interest, if an '"of'
royalty interest is intended. And the size of that "fraction
'of' royalty" or "fixed royalty" should be stated as a
single rather than a double fraction.
However, as a Texas court noted in Barker v. Levy
when reviewing drafting advice regarding the "mineral

or royalty" issue, "It is quite probable that these [parties)
now heartily agree with this advice. However, it was
written [decades) too late to have been helpful" in the
shale era. 104 Title examiners could view the Texas
Supreme Court's decisions declining petitions for
review in Sundance Minerals, Range Resources and
Coghill as approval of those better-reasoned
opinions. 105 The Texas Supreme Court's opinions in
Lucke/ and Concord Oil also support the approach in
those three cases by acknowledging the legacy of the I /8
royalty. 106 Absent finner endorsement from the state's
high court, however, these mixed opinions may
motivate parties to file lawsuits over deeds with double
and restated fractions in the shale era. The next section
addresses whether the recent Hysaw opinion has
provided that endorsement.

III. HYSA W V. DA WK/NS: THE TEXAS
SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES THE
"DOUBLE FRACTION" DILEMMA
In addition to the appellate cases discussed above,
the fourth court of appeals produced two other opinions
reflecting different analytical approaches to double and
restated fractions. One was Dawkins v. Hysaw, 107 the
opinion eventually reversed by the Texas Supreme
Court, and another was Graham v. Prochaska. 108
Handed down only a few months before Dawkins,
Graham held that a grantor reserved a floating 1/2 of the
lease royalty in a new lease based on the reservation of
"one-half (1/2) of the one-eighth (1/8) royalty ... same

""See, e.g.. Sundance Minerals, 354 S.W.3d at 511-12
(finding the grantor meant to reserve "one half of the usual
one eighth" royalty); Rm1ge Res. Corp., 266 S.W.3d, at 493
(noting the problems the estate misconception played in deed
construction); Coghill, 358 S.W.3d at 838-39 (harmonizing
the differing fractions in the deed in light of the usual 1/8
royalty).
'°'Hudspeth v. Berry, No. 2-09-225-CV, 2010 WL
2813408, at *I (Tex. App. July 15, 2010) (interpreting the
deed as gianting two fixed royalty interest instead of the
"I/5th of I/8th" royalty): Moore v. Noble Energy, Inc., 374
S.W. 3d 644, 651 (Tex. App. 2012) (interpreting the deed to
"reserve a royalty of one-half of one-eighth of production, or
one-sixteenth"); Wynne/Jackson, 2013 WL 24 70898, at *1-2.
*5 (Tex. App. June 6, 2013) (finding that the interest
conveyed was a fractional royalty, not a fraction of royalty
and entitled Wynne/Jackson to one sixteenth of production
instead of 1/2 of the usual 1/8 royalty).
'"'See Moore, 374 S.W.3d at 647-48 (Tex. App. 2012)
(relying on MARTIN & KRAMER. supra note 5, to insert
language into the deed). The Moore opinion also diverts to
another troubled interpretative trail: the court views the lack
of a producing well at the time the deed was drafted as
relevant to interpreting the deed Id. at 651. However. as I

note 2, at 129 (analyzing Oklahoma approach, which allows
the term "royalty,. to change depending on existence of lease
at time of drafting). See also Wynne/Jackson, 2013 WL
2470898, at *1-2. *5 (interpreting deed language describing
a "'one-half(l/2) of the usual one-eighth (1/8) royalty in and
to all oil, gas and minerals, produced, saved and sold from
[such property]"' as granting a fixed royalty of 1/16 of the
production).
104
Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974).
105

The same reasoning \vould apply to the Texas Supreme
Court's decision not to accept petitions for the multiclause

deed cases, Garza and Hausser. But see TEX. R. APP. P. 56.1
(noting petitions denied do not carry the same precedential
value as petitions refused, \Vhich are viewed as Supreme

Court opinions).
106
See Luckel v. White, 819 S. W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991)
(discussing the "usual one-eighth royalty"); Concord Oil Co.
v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 459
(Tex. 1998) (noting the prevailing royalty in private oil and
gas leases was a 1/8 royalty during the Era in which the
Concord deed was executed).
""450 S.W. 3d 147 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 2014, pet.
granted).
108
429 S.W. 3d 650 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013, pet.
denied).

have written in other articles, allov..ing such extraneous facts
to affect the interpretative process detracts from title stability.
See Burney, lnte1preting Mineral and Royalty deeds, supra
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being equal to one-sixteenth (I/16th) of all oil, gas and
other minerals. In Graham, the court relied on Concord
Oil and reasoned that the fraction l/J 6 could be
hannonized in light of the once-standard l /8 lease
royalty. 109 Dissenting justices disagreed, having
concluded that the majority opinion had improperly
relied on outside deeds in reaching its conclusion. " 0 In
its opinion in Dmvkins, however, the fourth court of
appeals' opinion does not cite Concord Oil, or invoke
the effects of the "estate misconception" or the "legacy
of the I /8th lease royalty." Instead, the opinion viewed
devises of an I /3 of I/8th non-participating royalty as
creating a fixed I /24th in certain lands, even though the
fraction l/24 does not appear anywhere in the mother's
will. The losing parties in Graham and Dmvkins filed
petitions for review. Ultimately, the court denied the
Graham petition and granted the petition in Dmvkins.

Hysaw Facts 111
The Will. Ethel Hysaw ("Ethel") executed her Will
in 1947 and died in 1949. She was survived by her three
children, Inez Hysaw Foote ("Inez"), Howard Caldwell
Hysaw, Jr. ("Howard") and Dorothy Frances Hysaw
Burris ("Dorothy"). At the time she executed her Will,
Ethel owned three non-contiguous tracts of land. Under
the Will, she gave each child a specific tract of landthe north 600 acres of a I 065-acre tract went to Inez; the
remaining 465 acres of that tract went to Dorothy; and a
separate 200-acre tract (her homestead) and a 150-acre
tract went to Howard.
The Hysaw/Burris heirs, who lost in the court of
appeals, argued that although Ethel gave different
surface estates to each child, Ethel gave each child equal
royalty interests in all of the tracts, including the surface
tract willed to each child. The Will accomplishes this
royalty grant in three paragraphs. The first paragraph
sets out the basic grant to all three children and then
provides a long clarification passage regarding what is
granted to Inez. The second two paragraphs set out
identical clarifying language with respect to Dorothy
and Howard. The three paragraphs are set out below:
A.

That each of my children shall have and hold
an undivided one-third (113) of an undivided
one-eighth (118) of all oil, gas or other
minerals in or under or that may be produced
fi·om any of said lands, the same being a
non-participating royalty interest; that is to
say, that neither of my children, to wit, Inez
Hysaw Foote shall not participate in any of the
bonus or rentals to keep any lease or leases in
force; that it shall not be necessary for the said
Inez Hysaw Foote to execute any oil, gas or
109

/d. at 659--60.
/d. (Barnard. J., dissenting).
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mineral lease over the lands of Dorothy
Frances Hysaw Burris or over the lands of
Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., and that it shall
not be necessary for Inez Hysaw Foote to
obtain the consent either orally or written of
the said Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris or
Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., to lease any
portion of said land so willed to her for oil, gas
or other minerals,.but that the said Inez Hysmv
Foote shall receive one-third qf one-eighth
royalty, provided there is no royalty sold or
conveyed by me covering the lands so willed
to her, and should there be any royalty sold
during my lifetime then the said Ine= Hysmv
Foote, Dorothy Frances Hysmv Burris and
Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr. shall each
receive one-third of the remainder of the
unsold royalty.
That Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris
shall not participate in any of the bonus or
rentals to keep any lease or leases in force; that
it shall not be necessary for the said Dorothy
Frances Hysaw Burris to execute any oil, gas
or mineral lease over the lands of Inez Hysaw
Foote or over the lands of Howard Caldwell
Hysaw, Jr., and it shall not be necessary for
Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris to obtain the
consent, either orally or written, of the said
Inez Hysaw Foote or Howard Caldwell
Hysaw, Jr., to lease any portion of said land so
willed to her for oil, gas or other minerals, but
that the said Dorothy Frances Hysmv Burris
shall receive one-third of one-eighth royalty,
provided there is no royalty sold or conveyed
by me covering the lands so willed to her, and
should there be any royalty sold during my
lifetime then the said Dorothy Frances Hysaw
Burris, Inez Hysmv Foote and Howard
Caldwell Hysmv, Jr., shall each receive onethird of the remainder of the unsold royalty
That Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., shall
not participate in any of the bonus or rentals to
keep any lease or leases in force; that it shall
not be necessary for the said Howard Caldwell
Hysaw, Jr., to execute any oil, gas or mineral
lease over the lands of Inez Hysaw Foote or
over the lands of Dorothy Frances Hysaw
Burris, and it shall not be necessary for
Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., to obtain the
consent either orally or written of the said Inez
Hysaw Foote or Dorothy Frances Hysaw
Burris to lease any portion of said land so
willed to him for oil, gas or other minerals, but
111

The facts provided here appeared in the Hysaw's Brief
on the Merits in the Texas Supreme Court.

110
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that the said Howard Caldwell Hysmv, Jr.,
shall receive one-third of one-eighth royalty,
provided there is no royalty sold or conveyed
by me covering the lands so willed to him, and
should there be any royalty sold during my
lifetime then the said Howard Caldwell
Hysaw, Jr., Inez Hysmv Foote and Dorothy
Frances Hysaw Burris shall each receive onethird of the remainder of the unsold royalty.
(emphasis added).

Chapter 20

times the royalty provided to Howard and Dorothy's
descendants. The Hysaw/Burrisses contended that the
Will created equal floating 1/3 of royalty interests,
meaning all three children share equally regardless of
the size of the lease royalty in all of the lands devised
under the Will.
The Dawkins argued that Howard's and Dorothy's
descendants each received only a fixed 1/24 royalty in
Inez's land and that the Dawkins therefore get all royalty
in excess of a 2/24 royalty on Inez's lands. At the same
time, the Dawkins claimed that equal sharing is required
on Howard's two tracts because Ethel conveyed some
of the royalty on those tracts before she died. For this
argument, they rely on the final phrase regarding any
"sale" of royalties before Ethel's death. The parties
stipulated to the pertinent facts and filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. The district court granted the
Hysaw/Burrisses' motion, requiring equal sharing to
apply for royalties in all of the lands. The Dawkins
appealed.
The court of appeals reversed. In its opinion, the
court began by examining the three phrases in the
royalty paragraphs "individually" and determining what
each one meant. The court first addressed the phrase that
"each of my children shall have and hold an undivided
one-third (1/3) of an undivided one-eighth (1/8) of all
oil, gas or other minerals in or under or that may be
produced" and held that this language "clearly and
unambiguously describes a fractional royalty
interest"-a 1/24 royalty. 113 The court stated this phrase
was a "reservation" of fixed 1/24 royalties only for
Dorothy and Howard. Later in the opinion, the court also
calls it a "'grant." 114
The court held that the second phrase, that "[each
child] shall receive one-third of one-eighth royalty" also
"clearly describes a fractional royalty interest-a fixed
fraction of production" and further held that it "simply
restates the first provision's grant." 115 The court treated
this phrase as applying to all three children and stated it
did not "limit [] the surface estate owner of any royalty
in excess of 1/24 of production," indicating the surface
estate owner's ownership of royalty in excess of 118
came from "the earlier grant of fee simple title." 116
Finally, the court held that the third phrase was "clear
and unambiguous" and "conditionally conveys a
fraction of royalty interest" i.e., a second grant of a
floating 1/3 of the royalty in Howard's lands to each
child because Ethel had conveyed some of those

The Hysaw and amici curiae briefs urged the Court to
consider that Ethel's grant to each child of different
surface tracts and a grant to each child of an equal share
in the royalties in all tracts is a common approach in
partitioning surface and mineral estates. 112 When
partitioning surface and mineral estates by deed or will,
owners often grant unequal surface estates to family
members but-because mineral estates cannot be easily
valued-require equal sharing in the oil and gas
production from all tracts. The Hysaw Brief on the
Merits also cites E. Smith & J Weaver, Texas law of
Oil and Gas, Sec. 2.3[A}[4] p. 2-41 ("Because parties
to a voluntary partition are often unwilling to run the
risk that only part of the land may contain oil and gas, it
is not uncommon for cotenants to partition only the
surface and continue to own undivided interests in the
1ninerals estate.").

In 1946, before she executed the Will, Ethel gave
each child an equal share in some of her royalties in the
200- and 150-acre tracts given to Howard. The six deeds
making these conveyances give each child an equal
portion of Ethel's royalty in each tract. The Hysaw and
Weafer Petitioners ("Hysaws") are Howard's
descendants. The Burrises, the Burris partnership and
the Dziuk Petitioners are Dorothy's descendants or
successors. The Burrises and Hysaws are referred to
collectively as the "Hysaw/Burrisses." The Dawkins
and Oxford Respondents are Inez's descendants and are
collectively referred to as the "Dawkins."
The Dispute: This dispute arose after production
occurred on a 1/5 royalty lease the Dawkins executed on
Inez's 600 acres. Under a 1/8 royalty lease that was the
standard when Ethel executed her Will, all parties would
have agreed that the Will provided each of her three
children with equal shares of the royalty. The Dawkins,
however, contended that, under the 1/5 royalty lease
they executed, the Will provided them with over three
n 2The Hysa\v's Brief on the Merits urged the court to
consider this custon1ary approach to partitioning land and
minerals as did :Mr. Jeff Akins in an amicus curiae brief he
filed. T\vo other arnicus curiae briefs \Vere filed. One by two
former chairs of the Oil, Gas and Energy Resources Section

and another on behalf of Trinity Minerals, Inc., filed by J.
Byron Burton III.
113
Dawkins v. Hysaw, 450 S.W. 3d 147, 154 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio, 2014, pet. granted).
114
Jd. at 155.
"'Id. at 154, 156.
116
Jd. at 156.

of the State Bar of Texas, Cottie Miles and Allen Cummings,
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royalties to her children before she died. The court refers
to this third phrase both as a conveyance and as a
"conditional reservation ofa fraction ofroyalty." 117
These holdings resulted in Inez's descendants
receiving royalties under the Dawkins' lease more than
three times greater than her siblings' descendants but
sharing equally in royalties from any lease on the tracts
given to Howard. In contrast, under the Hysaw/Burrises'
interpretation of Ethel's Will, the children share equally
by owning a floating l /3 NPRi in all three tracts. In its
opinion, the Texas Supreme Court agrees with this
equal-sharing interpretation.

The Texas Supreme Court Opinion: Affirming
a "Holistic" Approach Rather than "Merely
Multilying" Double Fractions
The Texas Supreme Court's opinion begins with
this description of the issue:
B.

Questions arise about whether double
fractions must be multiplied and the royalty
interest fixed without regard to the royalty
negotiated in a future mineral lease (fractional
royalty) or whether 1/8 was intended as a
synonym for the landowner's royalty,
meaning the interest conveyed varies
depending on the royalty actually obtained in
a future mineral lease (fraction of royalty). 118

Chapter 20

detenninative in the deed-interpretation process. 123
Returning to the express language of Ethel's will, the
court also noted the equal-sharing language in the third
and final provision of each royalty clause supported a
conclusion that she intended for each of her three
children to share equally in the royalties under all the
divided tracts. 124 After a thorough review of case law
and the language in the will, the court concluded as
follows:
The only plausible construction supported by
a holistic reading of the will is that Ethel used
'one-eighth royalty' as shorthand for the
entire royalty interest a lessor could retain
under a mineral lease, anticipated the siblings
would share that royalty equally, and intended
proportional equalization of any royalty
remammg following
an
inter vivas
transaction. We therefore hold that Ethel's
will devised to each child l /3 of any and all
royalty interest on all the devised land
tracts. 125

IV. CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FROM HYSA W
FOR INTERPRETING AND DRAFTING IN
THE SHALE ERA
Because Hysaw reaffirms a "holistic" approach that
requires reviewing all language and provisions in
documents, one cannot proclaim that the decision has
ended the ''fixed v. floating" interpretative issue in
Texas. However, the opinion should provide confidence
to title examiners who have declined to "merely
multiply" double fractions when one of those fractions
is the once-common I/8th landowner's royalty. And for
those considering litigation, other courts are likely to
view the I/8th as meaning "landowner's royalty," and
the fraction paired with the l /8th as reflecting the
parties' intent regarding the size of the non-participating
royalty interest conveyed or reserved.
For drafting these interests in the future, parties
should use the "fixed or floating" labels: Grantor hereby
conveys to Grantee a fixed I/] 6'h non-participating
royalty interest. lf the parties intend to create an npri
that will "float" with the royalty reserved in any lease
on the property, eristing or future, the document should
make that statement. In describing the size of the
floating fraction, which was 113 in Hysaw, parties
should avoid double fractions. (The "113 of l/8 1h" from
Hysaw). Jn fact, part of the "legacy of the I/8th lease

In answering these questions, the court reaffinned its
commitment to a "holistic approach" aimed at
ascertaining intent from the entire document. 119 For that
reason the court eschewed mechanical or bright-line
rules, such as merely multiplying double fractions. 120 In
criticizing the court of appeals' decision, the court
opined that the lower court had departed for this holistic
and instead viewed the separate clauses in the will in
isolation. 121
Demonstrating its commitment to the "holistic
approach," the opinion carefully and thoroughly
addressed all the language in the will. 122 Key phrases the
court emphasized included the deliberate recitation of
identical language to effect each child's royalty, the use
of a double fraction in lieu of single fixed fractions, with
one suggesting equal l /3 sharing and the others "raising
the specter of "estate misconception" or the use of the
then-standard l /8 royalty as a synonym for
"landowner's royalty." With that acknowledgement, the
court confinned its statement in Concord Oil that the
"'estate misconception" 1s instructive but not

119/d

i121d. at *4.
113
ld. at *6.
124
1d. at I 0.

120

/d. at *7-8.

125/d.

121

/d at *3 and 9.

117/d.

i18Jd at *I
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royalty" includes the lesson that it has no place in
drafting Shale Era mineral and royalty interests.
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